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Understanding how people interpret risks and choose actions based on their interpreta-
tions is vital to any strategy for disaster reduction. We review relevant literature with the
aim of developing a conceptual framework to guide future research in this area. We stress
that risks in the context of natural hazards always involve interactions between natural
(physical) and human (behavioural) factors. Decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty is inadequately described by traditional models of ’rational choice’. Instead, attention
needs to be paid to how people’s interpretations of risks are shaped by their own
experience, personal feelings and values, cultural beliefs and interpersonal and societal
dynamics. Furthermore, access to information and capacity for self-protection are typically
distributed unevenly within populations. Hence trust is a critical moderator of the
effectiveness of any policy for risk communication and public engagement.
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A recent report [1] highlighted the need for a better
understanding of human decision-making in the face of
risk as a priority for disaster risk reduction, noting that‘‘The risk associated with environmental hazards depends
not only on physical conditions and events but also on
human actions, conditions (vulnerability factors, etc.),
decisions and cultureyThe seriousness of the conse-
quences of any disaster will depend also on how many
people choose, or feel they have no choice but, to live and
work in areas at higher risky’’ (ICSU [1], p. 14).To address this challenge, we offer a critical overview
of research and theory on the relationships between how
people interpret risk and the decisions they make as a
consequence of such interpretations. We aim to clarify the
key concepts and theories concerning the processes
underlying interpretation of risk and decision-making
under uncertainty so as to make these more accessible
to theoreticians and practitioners in the ﬁeld of natural
hazards.
In adopting this focus, we are not attempting to offer a
comprehensive review of the large literature on the
causes (still less, the consequences) of disasters. As many
have argued, disasters cannot be properly understood, or
indeed prevented, without attention to the critical role of
human agency and societal processes [2]. Disasters
occur—and hazards are experienced—within contexts
characterised by varying levels of vulnerability and resi-
lience and different kinds of cultural beliefs and world
views [3]. Scientiﬁc research itself incorporates particular
world views and we need to be vigilant of the implicit
assumptions in the words with which different concepts
and theories are framed.
Indeed, the very term ‘natural’ is contentious, to the
extent that it could imply that disasters are merely the
consequence of meteorological or geophysical events
beyond human control or responsibility. This is absolutely
not our intention. Instead, we use the term more munda-
nely and pragmatically so as to signal that (as in the ICSU
[1] report) we do not attempt to cover the literatures on
risk interpretation within the contexts of industrial
hazards, pandemics, war and conﬂict, and such like. There
are continuities with these other literatures, but they
mostly fall beyond the scope of this paper, even though
(as the Fukushima accident demonstrates) ‘natural’ and
industrial hazards may exacerbate one another. Likewise,
the issue of climate change is part of the background
rather than foreground of this review. How disaster risk is
inﬂuenced by climate change, and how climate change is
inﬂuenced by human decisions and activities, are clearly
questions of the greatest importance, but we cannot do
justice to them in this review.We see our present exercise, likewise, as complementing,
rather than in any way contesting, the large literature on
why some communities are more vulnerable, or resilient,
than others [4–8]. Vulnerability is a function both of place—
where people live and work—and of human activities
and social interactions. Physical features of an environment
(e.g. extent of seismic activity, susceptibility to storms or
ﬂoods) are obviously important, but so too are the adaptive
or maladaptive responses of individuals and communities
to such hazards. The physical environment will itself reﬂect
the impact of human activity, often in ways that increase
such vulnerability, for instance with building on ﬂood
plains, or the destruction of mangroves for commercial ﬁsh
farming. And, of course, human activity is a major driver of
climate change, which in its turn increases the vulnerability
of populations in large parts of the world to ‘natural’
disasters [7,9]. Thinking of behavioural processes as merely
moderating the effects of physical hazards, therefore, is not
just inadequate, but misconceived. As with cultural beliefs,
vulnerability or resilience constitutes a context within
which hazards are experienced. Too often, communities
are vulnerable not simply to single hazards in isolation, but
to combinations of perils, including disease, personal and
ﬁnancial insecurity, exploitation, violence and displace-
ment. Understanding the historical and political processes
that create and maintain such vulnerabilities is absolutely
central to an explanation of disasters. But again, it is not the
speciﬁc purpose of this paper to describe such processes in
general. Vulnerability, like culture, is an aspect of the
contexts within which hazards are experienced and risks
interpreted [3].
Regardless of the sources of vulnerability in natural
disasters, the question still remains: how are risks inter-
preted and acted upon within, and as a function of, such
contexts? This is our question here, and to try and answer
it, we need to examine a range of concepts, relating more
closely to how people (individually and in groups) deal
with uncertainty, update their beliefs on the basis of
feedback and make choices among alternatives. In doing
so, our review will draw especially on research and theory
in psychology and decision sciences to illustrate the
potential contribution of these disciplines to an under-
standing of responses to natural hazards.
2. Deﬁning risk
The concept of risk is a central issue for policy in areas as
diverse as health, environment, technology, ﬁnance and
security [10]. How are risk beliefs developed and enacted?
How can risks (that reﬂect relationships with the environ-
ment and are culturally, socially and psychologically con-
structed) be reliably identiﬁed? How can they be managed?
Under what circumstances should they be accepted or
rejected? Most importantly, how are they likely to be
interpreted or ‘perceived’ by different people? It is difﬁcult
to give general answers to these questions if we deﬁne risk
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commonly call ‘risky’. Rather than attempting to deﬁne risk
in terms of topics, however, we can attempt to do so in terms
of processes, and these, we suggest, may turn out to be quite
general and applicable across a wide range of topics. Decision
sciences traditionally deﬁne risk as a function of (a) the
likelihood and (b) the value of some possible future event or
events. As we shall see, even the terms ‘likelihood’ and ‘value’
need to be used cautiously. Likelihood may mean more
than statistical probability and value more than economic
beneﬁt and cost. More importantly, however, risk arises not
just from how some future can be described, but from the
uncertainty, actual or perceived, surrounding that description.
Indeed, it is only because we need to act under conditions of
uncertainty that the concept of risk is of any interest
whatsoever. Living with natural processes that are periodi-
cally hazardous means that people have choices to make,
even though differences in social and cultural beliefs and
characteristics may result in some communities and indivi-
duals having many more options open to them than others,
and these choices can have consequences for themselves and
others. It is because these consequences are uncertain, and
may leave us better or worse off, that we talk about ‘risk’.
Uncertainty often leads people to depend on others
to provide information. These others can be scientists or
government agencies, but also fellow community members
who share or contest their interests and values [11–14].
Hence, the quality of relationships (e.g., the degree to which
people identify with others, trust relationships that have
developed over time) with these others inﬂuences how
they deal with uncertainty. The processes to be discussed
are commonly termed ‘risk perception’. However, ‘percep-
tion’ usually implies that there is something ‘out there’ to
be perceived. Among other problems, this leads too readily
to looking at such discrepancies as may arise between the
views of different stakeholders primarily in terms of whose
views are more ‘correct’, whereas, as already noted, risks
are inherently uncertain and no one perspective is likely to
have a monopoly on the truth. The far more important
question is why different individuals and groups hold the
opinions that they do and how they are developed, enacted,
sustained, and changed. We therefore prefer to use the
phrase ‘risk interpretation’ to refer, more neutrally, to how
we anticipate the outcomes of choices made either by
ourselves, or by other decision-makers. Simply stated,
interpretation of risk is a special case of the interpretation
of uncertain information, and ‘risk-taking,’ ‘preparing’
and ‘avoidance’ are special kinds of actions chosen
under conditions of uncertainty. How such information is
interpreted and actions are chosen depends, as we shall
see, on many factors, First, though, we need to deﬁne
uncertainty.
3. Deﬁning uncertainty
Risk arises from uncertainty, but how is uncertainty
itself to be deﬁned? Is uncertainty merely a state of
mind—a reﬂection of our own incomplete knowledge
(i.e. epistemic uncertainty)—or intrinsic to the nature of
the very things about which we seek knowledge (i.e.
aleatory uncertainty)? Applying this distinction, however,requires that we know the parameters of the distribution
we are considering. In many, if not most, real-life situa-
tions, this is far from straightforward.
To illustrate this, consider the simple case of tossing a
coin. If we toss the same coin a large number of times, the
number of heads should approximately equal the number
of tails. In this example, a probability is essentially a long-
run frequency, representing a frequentist view of probability.
However, when it comes to forecasting future events that
haven’t yet happened (for instance, low-probability high-
consequence disasters), there simply is not a distribution of
previous events from which to extrapolate, although
sciences such as palaeogeography [15] are working on
deﬁning relevant distributions. Even when we are dealing
with events that happen relatively frequently in particular
locations (e.g. coastal or river ﬂooding), a judgement has to
be made whether the background conditions (under which
previous events have been recorded) have remained stable
or have altered, for instance due to climate change. In such
circumstances, probabilities cannot strictly be calculated
(deductively) but only estimated (inductively). Success and
(particularly) failure in forecasting can prompt more sys-
tematic methods and observations. But we are still dealing
with estimates, that is, interpretations of information, even
in the case of ‘expert’ forecasts. Clearly, this applies with no
less force to the judgements made by ordinary citizens on
the basis of personal experience, and typically with a less
formal understanding of relevant causal processes. In fact,
rather than access to mere statistics, it is mainly the
understanding of relevant causal processes, and often their
incorporation into formal models capable of simulation
and/or experimental testing, that both distinguishes expert
from less expert interpretations and underpins reliable
forecasting (where this is achievable).
As well as uncertainty over the likelihood of an event,
there may be uncertainty over the value of the conse-
quences, in part because ‘value’ means many things. In
some contexts (e.g. monetary proﬁt, insurance), it can be a
shorthand for the magnitude of any consequences. Even
regarding monetary outcomes, however, ‘objective’ value
(e.g. as measured in dollars) is nonlinearly related to
subjective feelings of (un)desirability, or ‘utility’ [16].
Understanding how people interpret risk is difﬁcult partly
because of the values they attach to different kinds of
outcomes (actual and anticipated). Furthermore, one
individual’s beneﬁt may be another’s cost and the dis-
tribution of such consequences (costs and beneﬁts) may
be uneven and/or unstable across spatial and temporal
domains. Societal impacts are not simply the sum total of
impacts at the individual level, whether these relate to
physical, psychological, social, or economic well-being.
4. Characterising previous research on risk
interpretation and decision-making
The literature on risk interpretation and decision-mak-
ing is both large and diverse and covers topics ranging from
public concerns about threats from natural and industrial
sources to changes in industrial development or changed
land-use (wind farms, waste storage or incineration, com-
mercial and housing development in rural areas). Similarly,
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feel that their health is endangered by a host of life-style
factors, in particular smoking, alcohol, diet and exercise.
There are lessons here for the connection between risk
interpretation and action, since a major concern is with
persuading people to adopt healthier habits. For instance,
does telling smokers that cigarettes damage their health
lead them to quit smoking? The answer is: sometimes and
somewhat, but not always [17]. So if not, why not? How far
might similar factors be involved when people fail to take
protective action in the face of natural hazards?
On the other hand, much research examines general
principles of how individuals formulate preferences and
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The expli-
cit focus here is more on the potentials and limitations of
human rationality. At any rate, that is the claim. But if one
is to propose general principles, one had better be sure that
they really are general, and not just limited to the speciﬁc
paradigms—let alone cultures—within which they have
been developed. In drawing lessons from the previous
literature—whether descriptive or theoretical—to the con-
text of natural hazards and disasters, moreover, we con-
stantly come across problems of scale. Most of the research
deals with the reactions of individuals considered singly,
facing a single threat or source of uncertainty at a single
point of time. A more adequate conceptual framework must
move beyond this to account for how individuals inﬂuence
and are inﬂuenced by one another in social and institu-
tional contexts, how multiple hazard events occur and
interact with one another, how people affect hazards and
hazards affect people, and how all such interrelations
evolve dynamically over time.
5. Individual decision-making under uncertainty:
beyond ‘rational choice’
The ‘rational choice’ model, developed initially within
classical economics, has been the starting point for much
research in this area. In simpliﬁed form, this approach
assumes that decision-makers compare the prospects of
alternative actions in terms of two attributes: the beneﬁts
or costs of each possible outcome and the probability of
each outcome. The product of the beneﬁt (or cost) and
probability then deﬁnes the ‘expected value’ (EV) of each
outcome, and it is assumed that this, and this alone,
determines preference. In other words, a ‘rational’ deci-
sion-maker should always prefer the option(s) with the
most positive EV.
This model has been subject to empirical and theoretical
challenges over many years. Especially pertinent is the
‘standard gamble’ paradigm where participants indicate
their preference for either of two options. Typically, one
option (A) is presented as a ‘sure thing’ chance of a speciﬁc
outcome, for example, a guarantee of winning $10. This is
then compared with a second option (B), which could be a
1-in-10 chance of winning $100 but a 9-in-10 chance of
winning nothing. According to rational choice theory, in
this example, participants should be indifferent between
the two options since both have the same EV, speciﬁcally
1 $10¼$10 for A; (0.1 $100)þ0.9 $0¼$10 for B. In
fact, participants fairly reliably tend to prefer option Awhen choosing between certain and uncertain gains. How-
ever, if the problem is stated as a choice between losses,
option B tends to be preferred. In Kahneman and Tversky’s
Prospect Theory [18], this is expressed by saying that
individuals tend to be ‘risk-averse for gains’ but ‘risk-
seeking for losses’. Risk is identiﬁed here with uncertainty,
option B being termed ‘risky’ because it is uncertain and not
because it is associated with a more negative EV.
Kahneman and Tversky [18] further stress that ‘gain’
and ‘loss’ are not absolute but relative to an implied
reference point that represents one’s expectations. This
is illustrated vividly by the fact that decision-makers’ pre-
ferences can be changed simply by altering the verbal
description of a problem so as to imply a different reference
point. Such ‘framing’ manipulations present the same out-
come as though it is a gain (thereby inducing risk aversion
in the sense above) or as a loss. For example, Tversky and
Kahneman [19] had participants imagine a choice between
two interventions to combat an epidemic where the
expected death toll was 600. In one condition, the choice
was between (A) an intervention that would save 200 and
(B) one that had a 1/3 probably of saving 600, but a 2/3
probability of saving nobody; in this condition 72% pre-
ferred A. In another condition, the same dilemma was
presented as one between (C) where 400 would die and
(D) a 1/3 probability of nobody dying, but a 2/3 probability
of 600 dying; in this condition, 78% preferred D. This is
because the ‘lives saved’ frame implies a comparison with
600 deaths, whereas the ‘lives lost’ frame implies a com-
parison with 0 deaths.
Research on health communication [20–22] shows that
messages can differ in their effectiveness depending on
whether they are framed as gains or losses, and whether
they focus mainly on detection (of symptoms) or self-
protection. There are important questions concerning
which message framings are likely to be most effective in
the context of natural hazards [23,24], where greater safety
demands both detection of any increased threat (through
attentiveness to warning signs) and anticipatory and reac-
tive protective measures (e.g. defences to buildings and
infrastructure, evacuation procedures).6. Heuristics
Another important concept emerging from the critique
of the ‘rational choice’ approach is that of cognitive heuristics
[25,26]. For instance, the availability heuristic states that
events are judged to be more probable if imagining or
recalling similar instances from memory is easier. Conse-
quently, people may give disproportionate weight to a few
memorable events (for instance if they receive vivid press
coverage) without recognising that their memory is selec-
tive. Of special relevance to judgement of risk is work by
Slovic et al. [27–29] on the affect heuristic. This states that
cognitive judgements, including estimates of probability,
can be strongly inﬂuenced by affective reactions. For
example, Dutch citizens who had more positive affective
reactions to the risk of ﬂooding expressed lower estimates
of the likelihood of future ﬂoods and weaker intentions to
take protective measures [30].




Safety False alarm Correct all clear 
Learning False alarms and hits 
difficult to distinguish 
Misses may be fatal, or 
consequences sporadic 
Fig. 1. Cross-tabulation of decision–outcome combinations, including
potential sources of error in learning from feedback following decisions.
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future events or prospects are often oversimpliﬁed. For an
event (or hazard, or policy) with multiple consequences,
there is no a priori reason why the evaluation of one
consequence (or aspect) should depend on how any other
consequence is evaluated. The null hypothesis is that
these separate evaluations should be uncorrelated with
each other. The evidence suggests otherwise. If an event
or prospect is emotionally charged, individuals tend to
resist acknowledging that it can have both clear beneﬁts
and clear costs. If they like it, they see it as having more
beneﬁts and fewer costs. If they dislike it, they see it as
having fewer beneﬁts and more costs. The tedious busi-
ness of estimating the total value of all beneﬁts and costs
is avoided by relying on the feelings elicited by viewing
the prospect as a single entity. Thus there are good things
you feel good about, and bad things you feel bad about,
and not much room for doubt in between.
At ﬁrst reading, research on heuristics offers a some-
what depressing view of people’s capacity for rational
decision-making. Among other dangers, it can offer a
justiﬁcation for authorities to dismiss any opposition or
dissent from ordinary citizens as ill-informed and irra-
tional [31]. However, it is important to look critically at
the evidence from which such inferences are derived.
In particular, the ‘standard gamble’ paradigm does not
realistically simulate the kinds of dilemmas to be addressed
by policy-makers or citizens when faced by actual hazards.
In this paradigm, the probabilities and values of the out-
comes to be considered are deﬁned by the researcher. Even
the uncertainties are known and deﬁned. In other words, a
large part of experimental work on cognitive heuristics
presents participants with a description of the decision
problem, whereas, outside the laboratory, decision-makers
typically need to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of
different consequences from their own experience.
Increasingly, research is showing that such decisions
from experience often result in very different choices from
decisions from description, even when ‘descriptions’ con-
vey accurately in advance the information that could
eventually be gained experientially from complete sam-
pling of the evidence available [32–35]. This applies
particularly to assessment of rare events that might not
be directly experienced if sampling of potentially avail-
able data is incomplete [36]. This is especially relevant to
natural disasters and hazardous events with a long return
period. However, even with more frequently experienced
events such as wildﬁres, risk assessments can be vulner-
able to bias [37].
Closely related is a tendency for people to treat small
samples of data as more representative than they really
are. Kahneman and Tversky [38] use the phrase ‘the law of
small numbers’ to refer to people’s readiness to over-
generalise from small sets of data. By deﬁnition, low-
probability disasters occur infrequently within a given
time period (or within a speciﬁc geographical area). If one
has not personally experienced a disaster, reliance on
personal experience may lead to an underestimation of
the statistical risk. This can also lead to overconﬁdence in
the effectiveness of safety procedures, the reliability of
building and infrastructure, etc., essentially because thesehave not yet been fully put to the test. The other side of
the story, however, is that, if a disaster does occur within
the small sample of cases one experiences, one may over-
generalise to regard all similar hazards as more dangerous
than the statistics would otherwise suggest.
7. Decisions from experience
When interpreting risk and making decisions on the
basis of experience, people attend to multiple character-
istics of risks, including not only the severity of the threat
or magnitude of potential consequences, but also their
ability to do something about the risk, uncertainties and
ambiguities about the risk, and what they know about the
hazards creating the risk in question [39–42]. Throughout,
experts differ from non-experts, and experts in one area
differ from those with other expertise [43,44]. Just as
people differ in their amounts and kinds of expertise, they
differ in their personal experience.
To ask how individuals base decisions on experience is
effectively to ask how people learn from their observations
and the consequences of their decisions. Responding appro-
priately in the face of risk involves, ﬁrst and foremost, an
ability to discriminate potentially dangerous situations
from ones that are more probably safe. A framework for
considering the costs and beneﬁts of different decisions
derives from a classic theory of visual perception known as
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) [45]. The problem this theory
describes is the ‘discrimination performance’ of a perceiver
faced with the task of identifying whether stimulus infor-
mation is evidence of a ‘signal’ or merely ‘noise’. For
instance, how does a radar operator distinguish between
a blip on a screen due to an approaching aircraft and one
due to atmospheric disturbance?
We can illustrate with the case where a decision-maker
is faced with (uncertain) information about a possible
hazard event. The choice to be made is whether to treat
any warning signs as evidence of a real and present danger
(‘signal’) or to conclude that the situation is actually safe
(‘noise’). This can be represented in terms of a cross-
tabulation (see Fig. 1—for the moment just consider the
four cells in the ﬁrst two rows) where one axis represents
the hazard level (i.e., danger or safety) and the other axis
represents the decision-maker’s judgement (i.e., treat as
dangerous vs. safe). Each of the resulting cells then has a
distinct meaning. Treating a real danger as dangerous
constitutes a ‘true-positive’ or ‘hit’; treating a real danger
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is actually safe as dangerous is a ‘false-positive’ or ‘false
alarm’ and treating a safe situation as safe is a ‘true-
negative’ or ‘correct rejection’. SDT describes the perfor-
mance of decision-makers in terms of two parameters:
sensitivity or discrimination ability (the proportion of cor-
rect responses, i.e. accuracy) and criterion or response bias
(the tendency to give response in one direction, e.g. to say
that danger is present, regardless of the facts). This second
parameter (criterion) is reﬂected in the type of errors made
and not merely their number.
Speciﬁcally, adoption of a riskier criterion will tend to
result in some ambiguous information being incorrectly
interpreted as safe (reﬂected in more false-negatives, or
misses), whereas a more cautious (risk-averse) criterion
will tend to result in more false-positives (false-alarms),
i.e. ambiguous information being incorrectly interpreted
as dangerous.
So what determines the choice of a criterion for any
decision problem? The ﬁrst thing to appreciate is that no
one criterion is any more correct than any other in an
absolute sense. It all comes down to what kinds of errors
we are prepared to accept and what kinds we are anxious
to avoid. (Ideally, we don’t want any errors, but that just
amounts to saying that we aspire to a situation where we
achieve perfect discrimination, in other words where
information is unambiguous. In such an ideal world, we’d
have no need to choose a decision criterion since there’d
be no uncertainty). Of major importance in the choice of
criterion are the anticipated costs and beneﬁts of different
decision outcomes. With natural hazards, the costs of a
miss (a failure to detect or predict a hazard event) can be
catastrophic. By itself, this should push decision-makers
in the direction of adopting a cautious criterion (or
‘precautionary principle’), where the chance of a miss is
reduced at the price of accepting more false alarms. But
the costs of false alarms are not necessarily trivial either,
especially if they occur repeatedly [46]. They may induce
complacency or cynicism among populations at risk if
warnings of imminent disasters fail to materialise.
Furthermore, preventive measures (e.g. evacuation) may
cause disruption to normal life and economic activity. The
important lesson here is that there is always a balance to
be struck, and it is best if this is made explicit. We live in
an uncertain, not an ideal, world.
This then leads to several questions that are at the
heart of risk interpretation and action. How should dif-
ferent costs and beneﬁts be valued? Whose costs and
beneﬁts should be given most weight? How fair is any
distribution of costs and beneﬁts between different par-
ties or stakeholders, between geographically separate
regions and between present and future generations?
These questions are intensely ethical and not merely
empirical, but it is vital that ethical debates are informed
by the best available empirical evidence. Next, how well
can one anticipate any such costs and beneﬁts? This bears
on the more general question of how we learn from
experience, and here there is much empirical evidence
from which lessons can be drawn. The original formula-
tion of SDT dealt with collections of discriminations
between signals and noise, but not with how suchdiscriminations are improved through learning and feed-
back concerning the outcome of such discriminations.
8. Learning
All learning is dynamic. That is to say, beliefs gained
through learning change over time as new information is
acquired. Most importantly, such beliefs allow us to
predict events. Predictions can be based on observations
of events that co-occur (associative learning) and/or
observations of the consequences of our own or others’
behaviour (instrumental learning). To understand how
beliefs change through either type of learning, we need to
consider what happens when our predictions appear to be
conﬁrmed, or not, by feedback from experience. Fairly
obviously, beliefs are strengthened by apparently conﬁr-
matory feedback and weakened by apparently contra-
dictory feedback. But why the qualiﬁcation ‘apparently’?
For at least three reasons: ﬁrst, because the evidence itself
may be uncertain and incomplete; second, because indi-
viduals appear biased towards interpreting ambiguous
information as consistent with their prior beliefs [47–49]
as well as maintaining closer social relationships with
others who share their views [50,51]; and third, because
decisions cannot be postponed indeﬁnitely, even if evi-
dence is incomplete.
If a decision is followed by a good outcome, this makes
the decision-maker more conﬁdent that the decision was
correct. This in turn increases the probability of making
the same decision in similar circumstances in the future,
and if the outcome is still favourable, the decision-maker
becomes even more convinced. However, there is a major
constraint on such ‘rationality’. Such choices not only
reﬂect previous learning but shape future learning by
constraining the kinds of feedback the decision-maker
receives. Put differently, people only sample from a
limited part of the ‘problem space’ (of decision-outcome
contingencies) and fail to learn if there are other, possibly
better outcomes, from different choices [52].
The original formulation of SDT focused on problems of
uncertain rather than incomplete information. Nonetheless,
we can extend this framework to consider how the choice
of criterion constrains the decision-maker’s opportunity to
learn from experience. A third row (‘Learning’) has been
added to the standard 22 matrix of decision–outcome
combinations in Fig. 1 to illustrate some of the difﬁculties
in learning from the outcomes of one’s decisions. First of all,
let’s suppose someone adopts a cautious or risk-averse
criterion. This should lead to fewer instances of damage
or disaster due to inadequate protective measures. The
price of this is a greater number of false alarms. But how
reliably can false alarms be distinguished from hits?
Research has shown that people are quick to learn to avoid
situations in which they have been hurt or frightened in the
past and that such learnt avoidance behaviours (e.g. certain
phobias) can be very persistent. Not only is avoidance
rewarded by feelings of relief from stress, it also means
that one’s fears remain untested by seeing if the danger is
real. Put differently, one cannot tell the difference between
a hit and a false alarm unless one can tell what would have
happened in the absence of such protective action.
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effective in avoiding an actual threat, but is over-used
where no threat exists. Not all avoidance behaviours,
however, rely on ﬁrm evidence of effectiveness. For exam-
ple, many people engage in superstitious rituals, adopt fad
diets, or undergo unnecessary medical procedures, as ways
of warding off personal misfortune or diseases which either
wouldn’t have happened anyway, or from which they
would have spontaneously recovered. If nothing bad then
happens, people (and in a medical context, not just patients,
but doctors too [53]) believe such actions to be effective
forms of protection. Not only does this mean that such
actions are reinforced (and hence repeated), it means that
people may ignore real signs of danger or recommenda-
tions for more effective forms of protection.
Now let’s consider situations where individuals adopt a
risky criterion, that is, treat some threats as less dangerous
than they really are. This can arise in many contexts where
instances of unsafe behaviour are not immediately or
inevitably followed by harm. In other words, people often
get away with behaving dangerously. Not all cases of
dangerous or even drunk driving lead to accidents, and
arriving unharmed at the end of such a drive may inﬂate
false optimism in one’s driving ability, or indeed capacity for
alcohol. (Of course, such luck can run out, but then if the
consequences for the individual concerned are fatal, learn-
ing stops anyway). Many dangerous health behaviours are
linked only probabilistically to actual diseases (even cigar-
ette smoking and lung cancer) and, importantly, such effects
can be delayed for many years. In the meantime, such
behaviours typically provide much more immediate gratiﬁ-
cation. Such cases are seen as examples of partial or delayed
reinforcement. The point in each case is that individual
experience often provides uncertain evidence of the actual
level of danger. This can also take the form of a discounting
of warnings where such advice can only be probabilistic. An
example is hurricane warnings, where the strength or
trajectory of the hurricane turns out to be less damaging
than originally forecast. In addition, as least in Western
cultures, many people show an optimistic bias where they
judge their own risk from hazards to be lower than that of
others [54]. This bias is likely to be aggravated with rare
events for which people lack personal experience [55].
Natural hazards vary enormously in the ‘reinforcement
schedules’ they impose on safer and less safe forms of
individual behaviour and policy. Most geophysical hazards
(less so for tsunamis than for earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions) are reasonably predictable in terms ofwhere they
are most likely to happen (although prediction of impacts,
not to mention their intensity, duration etc, at a very local
level is more difﬁcult and/or contentious). However, pre-
dicting when they will occur is far more challenging,
particularly when these are rare occurrences. By contrast,
weather-related hazards may happen more frequently, and
be associated with particular regions or seasons, but the
intensity of any impacts may be less predictable, not least
with the effects of climate change. Anecdotal evidence of
novel weather patterns, animal behaviour and growth of
crops and ﬂora is increasingly being supported by more
systematic analysis [56]. In all such cases, individuals may
use their own personal experience alongside availablescientiﬁc evidence when deciding on their response (if
any) to hazards in their environment. However, it is unclear
that people recognise the extent to which their decisions are
based on information that is not merely incomplete, but
potentially biased by their own previous decisions in the
direction of conﬁrming their prior judgements.
9. Trust in others
The question of how risk interpretation and action is
inﬂuenced by our trust in others is of central importance
in the ﬁeld of natural hazards. Ordinary citizens may need
to rely on scientiﬁc experts to provide information con-
cerning the severity and/or urgency of any threat, and on
risk managers to take many of the decisions required to
protect them from such threats. In turn, hazard managers
must trust that citizens will adopt recommended mitiga-
tion practices and react to events in predictable and
socially acceptable ways. But who is trusted by whom
and when, and how does acceptance of risk messages
depend on recipients’ prior belief systems?
In terms of who is trusted, research suggests that we
need to distinguish between trust in others’ knowledge or
expertise on the one hand, and their motivation, honesty
and integrity on the other hand. This closely parallels the
SDT distinction between discrimination ability and criter-
ion setting [57]. We want other people on whom we need
to rely both to know what they are doing and to use their
knowledge in a way that does not compromise our safety
and well-being for some inappropriate motive, such as
personal proﬁt. When we consult doctors for medical
treatment, we are putting our trust not only in their
expertise, but in their integrity to prescribe the treatment
that was most appropriate for us and not one that was
most proﬁtable to them personally, e.g. in terms of
insurance payments. When we take a ﬂight, we are
putting our trust in a whole range of professionals and
technological systems. Most of the time, we follow a
routine without thinking deeply about how others make
decisions on our behalf, but when an event disrupts this
routine, as when volcanic ash leads to the lengthy closure
of air space, and regulators need to decide if it is safe
enough, or too dangerous to ﬂy, the balancing of beneﬁts
and costs to all parties becomes exposed.
There are individual and cultural differences in people’s
beliefs in their own, and others’, ability to avoid or control
risks. Individual differences in personality and cognitive
style may be reﬂected in people’s conﬁdence in their ability
as decision-makers, their willingness to make a decision at
all as opposed to procrastinating or avoiding responsibility,
and how much they prefer ‘closure’ to continuing uncer-
tainty [58,59]. That is, some people may be particularly
likely to turn to others to help resolve their uncertainty.
Understanding who these individuals and groups are may
help in designing more effective risk messages.
In terms of culture, research suggests that some cultures
are more fatalistic than others when it comes to natural
hazards [60]. Fatalistic attitudes may be underpinned by
religious or spiritual beliefs of various kinds. The inﬂuence
of spiritual or religious fatalism may be inﬂuenced by the
phase of disaster being examined. While it may undermine
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the cultural fatalism within Buddhist beliefs may have
assisted recovery in Thai populations affected by the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami [61]. Likewise, confucianism pro-
motes long term thinking, perseverance and the importance
of preparing for future adversity and these cultural qualities
may translate an implicit fatalism into a degree of prepa-
redness. The relationship between human beings and nature
may also be viewed differently within different cultures.
A classic study by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck [62] found that
cultural groups in western New Mexico differed in their
preferences for value orientations described as ‘Man subject
to Nature’, ‘Man with Nature’ and ‘Man over Nature’. Hence,
cross-cultural comparison should be based on comparing
across cultural dimensions rather than countries [63] and
work on cross-cultural equivalence should be complemen-
ted with research into culture-speciﬁc mechanisms such as
Jishubo in Japan and the Hakka Spirit in Taiwan. The latter,
in particular, demonstrates how a culturally implicit belief
in learning to co-exist with nature inﬂuences risk beliefs and
resilience in the event of experiencing a hazard event.
Similarly, cultural beliefs about physical hazard character-
istics, such as native Hawai’ian beliefs regarding the rela-
tionship between Pele and lava ﬂows, can increase risk by
limiting choice of mitigation [63]. However, acknowledging
that risk interpretation can reﬂect cultural context does not
require us to treat culture as cause and risk interpretation as
effect. It is equally plausible to regard culture as partly
characterised by how people interpret and respond to risks
of various kinds [64].
As regard the content of risk messages, we recognise
that for hazards, such as earthquakes, that cannot be
prevented and only predicted with difﬁculty, it is under-
standable that many people will adopt a fatalistic attitude
that such events are beyond their control [65]. A policy
challenge here is that of convincing people that, none-
theless, there is much they can do that is within their
control, such as securing furniture and ﬁtments, preparing
stores and planning what to do if forced to evacuate.
Research showing which kinds of messages reduce peo-
ple’s fatalism about natural hazards, i.e. which messages
are trusted, can be applied to this challenge [66,67].
In addition to the content and focus of communications,
research also highlights ways to improve trust through the
processes of communication, i.e. not just what but how.
One construct that has been used to illuminate how trust
develops is empowerment [13,61]. Thus, certain commu-
nity characteristics (e.g., levels of active participation) and
competencies (e.g., collective efﬁcacy) may empower peo-
ple to identify and represent their hazard management
needs. Whether these needs are enacted may depend on
interactions with agencies who are responsive to commu-
nity needs (i.e., create empowering settings). These inter-
actions inﬂuence trust beliefs, with trust mediating the
relationship with intentions and preparation.
Finally, social processes, beyond the source–recipient
relation, are also strongly implicated in the way risk
messages come to be interpreted, and reinterpreted, over
time. Kasperson [68] uses the terms ‘social ampliﬁcation’
and ‘social attenuation’ to describe how different kinds of
risk are picked up (or not) by the media and other agentsand attract greater or lesser attention. In emergencies,
people do not simply attend individually to information
about what to do, but often try to evaluate it collectively
through comparing their interpretations with those of
others—a phenomenon known as ‘social milling’ [69–71].
People will converse with each other about the signiﬁ-
cance of any risk message, so that what emerges from
such ‘social milling’ is a composite of people’s individual
interpretations. This process may be greatly accelerated
and widened through the internet and use of information
communications technology.
Johnson [72] has argued that much of the previous
research on public trust in risk/disaster managers has
focused on perceptions of the different stakeholders sepa-
rately and attempts to compare to see who is more or less
trusted. However in reality, he argues, individuals have to
place their trust in whole systems of risk/disaster manage-
ment that depend on the interplay of these different agents.
Moreover, the public may trust the various actors in some
respects but not others, e.g. they may trust scientists to
accurately assess the risks but not necessarily to be most
concerned about the economic impacts [73]. A ‘mental
models’ approach [40] can improve our understanding of
how the public conceptualises not just the hazard but the
hazard management system and how trust and distrust can
emerge from these perceptions of competing interests and
perspectives. Also pertinent is research on factors that can
lead to a gain or loss in trust. There is a good deal of truth in
the adage that trust is easy to lose and difﬁcult to rebuild
[13,57]. A dilemma faced by many risk managers is how far
to go in admitting one’s mistakes. Such admissions can help
bolster one’s perceived honesty, but weaken one’s per-
ceived competence. However, failing to admit a mistake
and then being discovered in the deception is the worst
combination.
10. Complexity, scale and social context
As noted, applying lessons from previous research on
risk and decision-making to the context of natural hazards
is especially challenging because of the increase in scale
and complexity, and the fact that we need to consider the
interactions between the decisions made by several actors
rather than those of individuals considered singly. Different
actors may have different levels of access to relevant (e.g.
scientiﬁc) information, but this is only part of the story.
They also have separate, sometimes opposing, interests,
and may evaluate different outcomes very differently. The
aspects of risks (physical, economic, political) borne by
different actors often differ, and many decisions may have
the effect (if not the intention) of transferring risk onto
other groups, whether those with less economic or political
power, those living further away (e.g. in a different country
or jurisdiction) or future generations. Such risk transference
may be motivated by cynical self-interest, but may also
arise less deliberately from misinterpretation of risk and
failure to take account of the knock-on effects of inap-
propriate attempts to mitigate vulnerability to particular
hazards [74]. This clearly raises important ethical issues.
Scaling up from the individual to the societal level
requires more than a consideration of social collectives
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simply groups of individuals who happen to be cate-
gorised together, but groups of individuals who interact
and communicate with one another thus creating social
systems. Such interactions contribute directly to hazard
mitigation and community resilience [75–78].11. From risk interpretation to action
Assessing risk is one thing, acting on the basis of such
assessments is another. A pervasive misconception is that
ordinary citizens typically fail to protect themselves from
hazards because they are ignorant of ‘the facts’, irrational
in how they interpret information, or both. Citizens may
not always respond (as authorities hope) to risk warnings,
not because they are ‘irrational’, but because they feel
severely constrained in terms of the options open to them
(as when evacuation in the face of a less-than-certain
hazard will result in a loss of livelihood and means of
supporting one’s family). These constraints must be under-
stood and anticipated in any plans for disaster prevention
and risk mitigation.
When conceptualising preparedness, it is important
not to see it as an all or none process. Some people decide
not to prepare [79]. Others may be interested but need
more guidance. These starting points are different and
informed by different interpretive and decision processes
and intervention must acknowledge this. At the other end
of the preparedness spectrum are those who have acted
and whose continuing to do so may require engaging with
them in different ways.
Other things being equal, we would expect people to
choose actions that enhance or protect their health and
well-being and avoid actions that put themselves and
their families at risk. So why is there a gap between risk
interpretation and action? For a start, other things very
often are not equal. Knowing the risk and knowing how to
or being able to respond to the risk are not the same.
The same activities can have the potential for both
enhanced well-being and/or harm. Proﬁtable activities
can be relatively dangerous, as with farming on fertile
slopes of volcanoes or ﬂood-prone river valleys. Choices
which optimise beneﬁt while minimising risk may simply
not be available, or affordable, for people in many real-life
situations.
There is another vital distinction that is often over-
looked. Beliefs or expectations concerning hazards (e.g.
a hurricane or earthquake) differ from attitudes towards
acts to be undertaken in the face of such hazards
(e.g. evacuation, or making one’s home more secure).
A lot of this boils down to whether people think such acts
will be effective and/or within their own control anyway.
Research on individual health behaviour (e.g. smoking,
alcohol use, dietary behaviour) contains several examples
where unhealthy habits are supported by a whole set of
pessimistic self-beliefs, based on personal experience, that
changing one’s habits is very difﬁcult and trying to do so is
likely to end in failure [80]. Research on natural hazards has
found that people’s expectations about the efﬁcacy of
preparedness measures inﬂuences actions [13].Again, lessons can be drawn from the failures and
successes of policies to inﬂuence health behaviour, such
as cigarette smoking. One needs to start with evidence-
based messages that cigarette smoking (say) is dangerous,
but more is needed, since many smokers still continue,
and many young people take up the habit, despite
‘knowing’ the risks, at least in general terms. In many
countries, this ‘something else’ now involves: (a) at the
level of the individual, a ﬁner-grain analysis of the
reinforcement processes underpinning physical and psy-
chological dependence; and (b) at the level of the society,
re-engineering the environment to make the healthier
option many people’s default choice. However, if social
support is lacking, or even acts against behaviour change
(as in many groups and cultures where unhealthy beha-
viour is the norm [81]) policy initiatives by more remote
government authorities or even health professionals are
less likely to succeed.
How analogous are—or could be—policy initiatives for
disaster reduction in the context of natural hazards? At
the more individual level, there are opportunities for
interventions to make preventive or protective measures
more accessible and affordable. This could include micro-
insurance schemes for farmers in developing countries.
In more developed countries, grants and other ﬁscal
instruments can be used to incentivise more sustainable
behaviours such as lower energy consumption. At the
societal or more macro level, there are measures that
need to be put in place for which governments must carry
the primary responsibility. These include: setting up
effective facilities to monitor natural hazards and forecast
hazard events; deﬁning and enforcing regulations to
prevent unsafe land-use, building practices and industrial
activities that compromise environmental safety; protect-
ing vital infrastructure and planning for emergencies, e.g.
in relation to evacuation and relief provision. In many
such cases, what needs to be done is broadly already
known—what are needed, more typically, are the eco-
nomic resources and the political will to confront special
interest groups that may be more powerful than govern-
ments. International cooperation has an important part to
play here, not only through the pooling of scientiﬁc
knowledge and sharing of resources, but also through
providing examples of best practice and even moral
pressure from other states that can also be put at risk
through poor practice by their neighbours. There are,
however, many cases where the best that can be hoped
for is a mitigation of risks that have developed histori-
cally, especially through population movements and the
growth of cities in vulnerable locations.
Once again, though, the involvement and support of
local communities is vital. Conversely, when national
governments or international agencies are mistrusted by
local communities or vice versa, there will be huge
difﬁculties in putting policies into practice.
12. The way forward
Ultimately, research on natural hazards and disasters,
whether from a physical or behavioural science perspec-
tive, aims to offer knowledge that might help prevent
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ideally, knowledge for the common good as well as for its
own sake. Yet this ideal must be tempered by awareness
that the translation of research into practice is frequently
beset by obstacles of many kinds. Access to such knowl-
edge is limited, and those who have it may not share it,
nor use it for the common good.
Our focus in this paper has been on what lessons we
can draw from previous research in terms of how best to
conceptualise how people interpret risks and choose
actions based on such interpretations within the context
of natural hazards. This context is deﬁned not just by
vulnerability to some physical event, but also by social
relationships. Indeed, vulnerability itself is partly a func-
tion of such social relationships. The judgements and
choices underlying risk interpretation and action, then,
are not merely personal, but also interpersonal. However,
this is still a work in progress. The literature, while varied
and extensive, is not yet well integrated. More research on
social and research networks within the ﬁeld of natural
hazards could promote better integration [82].
There is increasing acknowledgement of the role of
human behaviour in inﬂuencing whether hazard events
develop into disasters. However, this acknowledgement is
rarely accompanied by a more than superﬁcial analysis of
the factors that determine human behaviour and obser-
vable differences between individuals and social groups in
their feelings, cognitions and actions. This imbalance in
research activity and funding, and proposals for research
on disasters and risk decisions, is exempliﬁed by the
recently released NRC report [83] on U.S. national earth-
quake resilience. By and large, integrated risk assessments
are lacking, and where they do exist, integration with the
social and behavioural sciences is weak.
The quality of data available to allow for more inte-
grated risk assessments is also uneven. Data quality issues
can stem from lack of monitoring technologies, insufﬁcient
funding, or suppression of data or delay (e.g., of disease
outbreak information by governments). There have been
major advances in earth observation and Geographical
Information Systems (GIS). Advances in GIS have been
hailed as offering potential means of forecasting a range
of natural disasters, including landslides [84]. However,
although considerable progress has been made, diffusion of
this technology is still hampered by factors such as pro-
blems in acquiring appropriate data, the complexity of
predictive models and a preference for data that can be
acquired at a low cost rather than data that are more
relevant and predictive. Even in the (relatively successful)
context of Tsunami warning systems, it is only recently that
much attention has been paid to what makes warnings
effective, and/or to the social milling [69–71] that happens
in disasters [85]. Some attempts have been made to develop
a more holistic model for effective warning systems, such as
that for volcanoes in New Zealand [86].
At the same time, much research in the social and
behavioural sciences, such as some of that reviewed in this
paper, has progressed in rather abstract contexts. This
means that vigilance is needed when extending the conclu-
sions of such studies to disaster research. While many of the
theoretical principles identiﬁed by such work may have ahigh degree of generality, it is important to look critically at
the paradigms employed, since these may fail to incorporate
factors that are crucial to much real-life decision-making.
We have, for example, highlighted the fact that many
laboratory experiments on decisions under uncertainty do
not deal with the kind of uncertainty that arises from
limited access to statistical information, nor with the
updating of estimates based on feedback from experience.
Yet any method that tries to look at the effect of ‘indepen-
dent variables’ while controlling for others has a major
limitation. It is often not well suited to the study of dynamic
interactions within complex systems over time and space.
Natural hazards and disasters are prime examples of com-
plex dynamical systems. From the standpoint of risk inter-
pretation and action, the primary interaction of interest is
that between human actors and the natural hazard. Take
away the hazard, and the people are safe, at least from the
speciﬁc peril in question. Take away the people, and we are
left merely with a geophysical or meteorological event, not
a disaster. But there are, of course, very many other inter-
actions over all kind of scales. The hazard events themselves
have complex dynamics, and interact with other events.
Likewise, the human actors are not isolated decision-
makers making one-off choices independently of everyone
else. How individuals and communities interact with one
another and shape their physical and social environments
greatly inﬂuences whether vulnerability and risk are exa-
cerbated, mitigated or transferred onto others separated by
time and/or place. Natural hazards and disasters highlight,
often graphically, our social dependence on one another. Yet
we have to start somewhere, to ﬁnd some thread to pull
that may disentangle part of the knot. One such thread is
how we, as individuals and as members of social networks,
interpret risk and act upon our interpretations.Acknowledgements
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